The liberal personality thrives not on a harmonious inner life, but on both 'internal' and 'external' value plurality, and a consequent unease or dissatisfaction. 1 And beside this, giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue. 2 In his essay "Charting Liberal Virtues," quoted above, political theorist Stephen Macedo gestures toward a central feature of the psychology of classical liberalism: a permanent-and productive-sense of epistemic anxiety, especially in relation to value judgments and the knowledge claims that frame them. Indeed, as I will argue below, principled liberalism requires acceptance of such a sense of anxiety as an inescapable aspect of authentic human experience. For the logic of liberalism depends upon an open-ended acknowledgement of the uncertainty of human understandings, including one's own. If one is utt erly certain, beyond any measure of doubt, about the rightness of one's own perspective, morals, lifestyle, etc., then one has no reason to be either epistemically anxious or liberal. 3 Of course, some measure of liberalism may be embraced simply as a modus vivendi. One may not have the necessary numerical, economic, or technological advantage to be able to enforce one's will (piece meal or wholesale), in which case one may compromise with others in order to avoid having someone else's will enforced on oneself. But such a purely pragmatic affi rmation represents a merely strategic, not a principled, liberalism. Genuine liberalism is not simply a political technique. It is a commitment to certain fundamental moral, anthropological, and, even, metaphysical assumptions-and their normative implications. Liberalism makes use of political techniques in order to manifest its commitments, but it shouldn't be confused with these techniques on account of that fact. The Federalist 4 is not just a user's manual; it is also an argument for a liberal understanding of the human condition. The quintessentially liberal pledge to "defend to the death" the right of another to speak an opinion of which one disapproves 5 would represent a violation of the very rationale for accepting liberal norms from the point-of-view of the merely pragmatic democrat. And such a pledge is pure lunacy from the perspective of anyone claiming an inerrant understanding of the right or the good. To repeat, then, an authentic (and steadfast) affi rmation of classical liberal values requires a certain epistemic stance, a stance that involves some measure of anxiety, the sort of anxiety that is bred of doubt. 6 One aim of this essay is to show that the inverse of this logic also holds true. Insofar as one acknowledges, even implicitly, that one is fallible and, therefore, incapable of "utt er certainty," then one must feel some anxiety about the epistemic status of one's beliefs and judgments. And insofar as one feels such anxiety, one is normatively obligated to affi rm basic liberal democratic principles, especially as relating to individual autonomy, the right of dissent, and the normativity of non-coercive deliberative discourse. More specifi cally, I will argue that the sort of anxiety just described represents an epistemic virtue, a cognitively basic response to the reality of human fallibility that should be understood as not only absolutely central to the liberal ethos and foundational to liberal norms but also defi nitively required by authentic religious commitment.
I will begin with a brief discussion of the historical context from which I am drawing this understanding of 'anxiety' (and its connection to classical liberalism), highlighting the contact between philosophical and religious themes that has been associated with the history of this concept. Next, I will explain my characterization of such anxiety as an 'epistemic virtue' and why I believe that it is the most fundamental of all liberal virtues, more fundamental, even, than 'tolerance' (which, I will show, ultimately rests on anxiety). Then, I will describe the phenomenology of epistemic anxiety and its role in democratic politics, contrasting my understanding with that set forth in a recent study of the function of anxiety in American democratic discourse by the political scientist George Marcus. 7 And, fi nally, I will discuss, in detail, the connection between epistemic anxiety and social and political tolerance, with particular att ention to the relationship between anxiety and religious faith.
Modernity, Anxiety, and Liberalism
The notion of 'anxiety'-angst, anxiété, etc.-played an important role in late-modern philosophy and theology, beginning with Kierkegaard's psycho-philosophical explorations of human subjectivity and belief and culminating in prominent philosophical and theological anthropologies of the early-and mid-twentieth century. In both its philosophical and theological formulations the term 'anxiety' generally denoted a profound awareness of human fi nitude and the various existential predicaments associated with it. One such predicament arises from the epistemic implications of fi nitude: On the one hand, we are rational beings, with the capacity to explore the nature of the world around us and to construct interpretations of its structure and signifi cance. On the other hand, we are also fi nite beings, whose perspectives and, therefore, understandings are contingent and incomplete. Hence, our conceptions of 'the truth,' particularly with regard to human purpose and moral judgment, are not, and never can be, absolutely reliable. 8 In the early-modern west, the systematic recognition of humanity's fallibility-in-fi nitude emerged along with the rise of deism during the seventeenth and (early) eighteenth centuries and found support in the critiques of ecclesiastical authority that took root in both philosophical and theological discourse during the Enlightenment. 9 Yet, during this period, absolute faith in the authority of canonical religious texts (and clerical interpretations of them) was not merely abandoned; it was, for most thinkers, replaced with an equally absolute faith in the authority and power of 'reason.' Thus, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century-when the 'unity' and ultimate verifi ability of the conclusions of reason began increasingly to be called into question-that the problem of human fallibility truly emerged in an acute form. 10 Kierkegaard may have been the fi rst fully to perceive both the philosophical and religious dimensions of modern anxiety, and his writings on the subject spurred the development of important philosophical and theological perspectives that took human fi nitude as the starting point of their analyses. In philosophy, the various problems associated with human fi nitude became a central focus of perhaps the most culturally prominent school of philosophical thinking of the twentieth century, existentialism. In theology, the anxiety provoked by an awareness of the implications of human fi nitude found prominent and perspicuous formulations in the writings of thinkers like Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich.
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Although fallibilism has remained a signifi cant theme in both philosophy and theology, however, the concept of anxiety has largely disappeared from the current discourses of these fi elds. In epistemological terms, any systematic appeal to anxiety regarding human fallibility has been supplanted by the formulation of 'coherentist' understandings of knowledge and cognition. In moral and political terms, the notion of 'tolerance'-representing the positively formulated, prescriptive fl ip-side of epistemic anxiety-has come to dominate much of the discussion. Of course, methodologically speaking, such a shift from a negatively framed to more positively framed formulations of the issue was quite natural. Yet, in making this shift away from theorizing the notion of anxiety itself, contemporary liberal philosophical and religious thinkers have given up a powerful methodological concept, one with the capacity to provide vital support to liberal norms.
There are challenges associated with att empting to use 'anxiety' in this way, to be sure, the foremost of which is to overcome the natural resistance to such a use of this term because of the common association of 'anxiety' with negative psychological states. This is a legitimate concern, especially given the fact that there are other terms, such as 'humility,' which, prima facie, may seem to bear the same relevant denotation but which do not carry the same negative connotations in common usage. I will defer responding to this concern fully at this point and refer the reader to the remainder of the essay. In particular, the relationship of anxiety to humility-and I do believe that there is an important relationship here-will be taken up explicitly in the second and third sections below. However, I will at this point off er one very general historical rationale for att empting to resurrect the sort of explicitly epistemic use of anxiety that I am referencing here.
The anxiety about their own fallibility as human beings that gradually emerged among a signifi cant portion of the literate public in the west during the modern period was one important element in the development, evolution, and survival of political liberalism. This idea is closely connected, but not reducible, to the commonplace historical claim that liberalism emerged out of the chastening eff ect that the European 'wars of religion' had on evangelical and sectarian enthusiasms. Certainly, all sections of society tired of the bloodshed that prefaced European modernity, but there was also an anxiety that sprang most directly from the erosion of the epistemic authority of religious institutions and the historical normativity of the biblical narrative. This is an anxiety that owed more to the persistence of the deists than to the excesses of the Cromwellians, and its power only increased as nineteenth-century thinkers like Darwin and Strauss further undermined the bedrock assumptions on which religious (and other) groups had predicated their competing claims to historical and normative orthodoxy. And, if such epistemic anxiety was an important psychological and social precondition for the development of pluralistic liberal norms, then it seems reasonable to assume that its maintenance is a necessary condition for the preservation of such norms.
Though western intellectuals have long comforted themselves with the myth of a so-called "secular age," the empirical evidence has never supported it. The vast majority of Americans identify, as they always have, as religious, and the very great majority of religious Americans identify as Christian. That does not make the United States a "Christian nation," but it does suggest that the potential tension between religious faith and political principles remains one of enduring concern in the US. Moreover, for those who are both religious and liberal (in the broad and classical sense), the continuing infl uence of dogmatic religious and moral claims in sociopolitical discourse suggests that we face much the same struggle against absolutism today that our Enlightenment predecessors faced in their time. Hence, we would do well to promote the sorts of att itudes that helped to shape their response to this challenge (which was successful enough to reconstitute the very nature of political society in the west).
Of course, one may object that, insofar as basic liberal values are related to respect for the 'dignity' or 'sacredness' of the human individual, there may be other routes to authentic liberalism than that which runs through anxiety. Aft er all, historically speaking, 'liberalism' (even in its classical sense) is a multivalent term, encompassing various related, but diff erentiable, conceptions. But the question is whether each of the various forms of 'liberalism' that emerged out of the Enlightenment are equally authentic, equally steadfast in their commitments to those principles that distinguish liberalism from more authoritarian modes of moral-political consciousness and practice. I cannot, here, off er an exhaustive survey of all of the particular diverse forms of liberalism that sprouted from the fertile theoretical ground of the Enlightenment. However, a very brief discussion of the divergence of the two most historically important branches of clas-sical liberalism will, I think, be suffi cient to indicate the basis for my claim that only a liberalism that refers, in some way or another, to a sense of epistemic anxiety is, ultimately, authentic and sustainable-as well as to indicate, in a preliminary way, the relevance of this view for religious faith.
Beginning with Isaiah Berlin's seminal essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," 12 political theorists have widely recognized a fundamental distinction between the liberalism that very early took root in modern English political philosophy through the works of thinkers like Milton, Locke, and (later) Mill, and the quite diff erent form of liberalism that emerged in France and Germany, through the combined infl uence of Rousseau and Kant (certainly there are also important diff erences within these groupings, but we are here focusing on their basic epistemic stances). For our purposes, Kant provides a perfect example of an Enlightenment liberal who arrives at a respect for human dignity and a principle of moral autonomy through an alternative route, one that bypasses the requirement of anxiety for which I am arguing. Indeed, Kant, perhaps more than any other philosopher, represents the urge to rescue some element of certainty from the jaws of epistemic doubt.
For our purposes, Berlin's discussion of Kant (and Rousseau) is particularly useful because it takes a teleological view, tracing the connections between the inner logic of Kantian liberalism and the successive, illiberal, developments in Continental political thought that followed. Critics have observed that Berlin simplifi es matt ers for himself by ignoring, or at least minimizing, certain statements by Kant (and Rousseau) that do not fi t neatly into his tidy analytical distinctions and historical narrative. There is certainly truth to this criticism. But it also, I think, misses the point. Berlin is interested in examining the theoretical and practical consequences that follow from various perspectives on human freedom. He adopts a broadly evolutionary perspective with regard to Kantian liberalism, rather than offering a more complex and nuanced exegesis, because he is less concerned with how Kant himself mediated the various tensions in his formulation than with how these tensions played themselves out in the thought (and practices) of those who took themselves to be following in his footsteps, as a measure of how well suited Kant's formulation really is to the task of grounding support for liberal norms. Since this is also our concern here, Berlin's analysis is apropos. Two points should be born in mind, though. First, the issue of whether liberalism can be adequately supported without explicit appeal to the implications of human fallibility does not map simply onto Berlin's famous distinction between 'negative' (Locke, Mill) and 'positive' (Kant, Rousseau) conceptions of liberty-though we may suspect that fallibilism fi ts more naturally with negative conceptions. Second, in drawing on his critique of Kant's positive conception of liberty, I am not endorsing Berlin's own particular negative conception as the only viable alternative.
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Rather than referencing human fallibility and an att endant sense of epistemic anxiety regarding that fallibility, Kant invokes the majesty of human reason in its capacity as moral lawgiver as the basis for his validation of individual autonomy. True freedom, according to Kant, consists in obedience to the moral law. And, although the moral law is unitary, one and the same for all, obedience ideally arises voluntarily, through the autonomous exercise of the individual's practical judgment, a product of the self-legislating function of rationality. The problem, however, is that people do not always agree about what rationality reveals to be the proper moral judgment in a given situation, nor even what abstract "maxims" (to employ Kant's terminology) ought to govern our conduct in general. But this can only mean that not everyone is as rational as everyone else. And, given the nature of the relationship between the faculty (and capacity) of rationality and right belief and conduct on Kant's view, this imbalance presents a potential challenge to the logic of autonomy. Berlin observes:
[For] Kant and rationalists of his type . . . the limits of liberty are determined by applying the rules of 'reason,' which is more than the mere generality of rules as such, and is a faculty that creates or reveals a purpose identical in, and for, all men. In the name of reason anything that is non-rational may be condemned, so that the various personal aims which their individual imaginations and idiosyncrasies lead men to pursue . . . may, at least in theory, be ruthlessly suppressed. . . . The authority of reason and of the duties it lays upon men is identifi ed with individual freedom, on the assumption that only rational ends can be the 'true' objects of a 'free' man's 'real' nature.
14 Combine such a view of rationality with some claim of absolute authority (be it political or spiritual), based upon some process or sign purportedly revelatory of the imprimatur of reason (or "truth"), and one has opened the door to the most severe abridgments of the very freedom of conscience that Kant begins by validating. This is certainly not to suggest that Kant's own defense of liberal norms was halfh earted or insincere. As Berlin is careful to acknowledge, Kant's intent was to shield the individual from illegitimate encroachments by "authority," whether political or religious, not to provide justifi cation for such encroachments (just as Rousseau's intent was almost certainly to articulate a model for deliberative self-governance among mutually autonomous individuals, not a totalizing communitarianism that swallows up the freedom of the individual in the name of the good of the 'sovereign' whole). Yet, as Berlin shows, despite their own best intentions, Kant's conception of rationality and its connection to the law (both moral and civil), in historical conjunction with Rousseau's oft en naïve assumptions about the moral and practical reliability of the regulatory expressions of the 'general will,' led, more or less directly, to the State-deifying conception of the relationship between political and moral right found in the Romanticism of Fichte and Hegel, the anti-liberal and deterministic stance of Marx's communism, and the totalitarian sensibilities (and, ultimately, practices) of their political successors in both Germany and the Soviet Union.
Noting the irony in this progression, Berlin asks, "What can have led to so strange a reversal-the transformation of Kant's severe individualism into something close to a pure totalitarian doctrine on the part of thinkers some of whom claimed to be his disciples?" The answer, it seems to me, lies precisely in Kant's failure to link his defense of moral and political autonomy to a recognition of human fallibility and its implications in relation to claims of authority. Kant is correct, in my view, to connect support for liberal norms to epistemology, but he neglects to take suffi cient account of human epistemic limitations in his formulation of this connection. It's not that respect for the dignity of the human individual qua rational agent has no role to play in the logic of liberalism. Respect for the individual's capacity to reason for herself is a necessary, but not a suffi cient, condition in the establishment of this logic. It requires a complementary relation to the sort of fallibilist delimitation of the claims of authority supported by an att itude of rationalized epistemic anxiety.
Kant's prescription that the individual never be treated merely as a "means" but always as an "end" does not necessarily translate into a proscription against illiberal coercion if one believes that the individual's salvation (be it political or spiritual) depends upon the acceptance of a set of beliefs and practices for the validity of which one claims absolute assurance. Under such circumstances, one may-consistently with Kant's principle (even if not his intent)-determine that it is crucial that the individual adopt the relevant point of view, even if coercion is required to guarantee this outcome. Similarly, one may determine that the use of force to prevent the dissemination of alternative beliefs and practices is required to ensure that the individual (or community) not be led astray from the "proper" path.
Though his intent was otherwise, Rousseau expresses the logic of such coercion in his famous proclamation that "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body, which means only that he will be forced to be free." 15 Fichte, then, provides the necessary bridge from republicanism to totalitarianism when he adds: "To compel men to adopt the right form of government, to impose Right on them by force, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has both the insight and the power to do so." 16 Thus, there is an historical case for the claim that 'liberalism' unconditioned by the moderating infl uence on ideological absolutism provided by a suffi ciently robust recognition of fallibility, in the form of an att itude of epistemic anxiety, cannot ultimately sustain itself without sliding over into an aggressively dictatorial illiberalism. The potential authoritarianism implicit in the logic of Kant's and Rousseau's works gradually revealed itself in the thought of their successors and, tragically, in the form of actual totalitarian regimes-with which the nations that had, contrarily, adopted the liberalism of Milton, Locke, and Mill were forced to struggle, in order to defend (among other things) the value of individual autonomy over against the claims of the state. Kant and Rousseau surely would have been appalled by what their "disciples" wrought, but that does not change the (revealing) fact that it was their disciples-not Milton's, Locke's, and Mill's-who drift ed to totalitarianism.
The relevance of this discussion in the context of religious belief should be obvious. If we replace the abstract political individual with a hypothetical religious apostate or heretic, and the state with the church, then we immediately see the consonance between Fichte's position and those forms of religious orthodoxism that privilege some particular (fallible) conception of "the truth" over the right of the individual to exercise moral and intellectual autonomy. Fichte's pronouncement is, of course, regarded with horror in light of the historic consequences of the adoption of this att itude as a principle of socio-political regulation in both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Similarly, such an att itude in the context of religious belief provokes horror in those who see the historical abuses of Christian dogma in, for example, the Inquisition, the brutal suppression of "heretical" views in Calvin's Geneva, or Christian missionizing in the context of western colonialism, as profoundly immoral-and, indeed, unchristian-and who hear echoes of this att itude in the belligerent dogmatism of contemporary fundamentalism and ultra-orthodox Catholicism. To be sure, contemporary religious conservatives do not advocate such methods of "discipline" or conversion as were applied in the above historical examples. But there is no hard and fast line to be drawn between the att itude of the contemporary orthodoxists and that of their religious antecedents, and it is worth remembering that the current cultural and political consensus repudiating such methods developed in spite of the att itudes (and eff orts) of past orthodoxists, not because of some internal check that they set on themselves out of respect for the dignity of others. Historically, the slippery slope into genuine brutality in the name of religious orthodoxy has been all too slick and the slide all too common (if not inevitable), when religious zeal is unqualifi ed by an acute awareness of the fallibility of human understandings.
'Anxiety' as an Epistemic Virtue 17
Despite the range of responses to the issue of epistemic anxiety off ered by philosophers and theologians during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a common tendency to understand such anxiety precisely as a problem in need of solution. Niebuhr, for example, blames human anxiety about the limitations of fi nitude for the ideological impulse that leads to absolutism in religious, moral, and political conviction. His description of the psychology of absolutism is worth quoting at some length:
Man knows more than the immediate natural situation in which he stands and he constantly seeks to understand his immediate situation in terms of a total situation. Yet he is unable to defi ne the total human situation without colouring his defi nition with fi nite perspectives drawn from his immediate situation. The realization of the relativity of his knowledge subjects him to the peril of skepticism. The abyss of meaninglessness yawns on the brink of all his mighty spiritual endeavors. Therefore man is tempted to deny the limited character of his knowledge, and the fi niteness of his perspectives. He pretends to have achieved a degree of knowledge which is beyond the limit of fi nite life. This is the 'ideological taint' in which all human knowledge is involved and which is always something more than mere human ignorance. It is always partly an eff ort to hide that ignorance by pretension. 18 Thus, for Niebuhr, anxiety is not only an inescapable consequence "of the paradox of freedom and fi niteness," but also "the internal precondition of sin," where 'sin' is understood as the illegitimate adoption of an absolutist stance with regard to one's own perspective, opinions, values, etc.
Yet, as Niebuhr goes on to observe: "[A]nxiety is not sin. It must be distinguished from sin partly because it is its precondition and not its actuality, and partly because [anxiety] is the basis of all human creativity as well."
19 In other words, it is not the att itude of anxiousness itself but, rather, the all too human tendency to att empt to purge oneself of unwanted anxiety, by ignoring both the feeling and its implications and indulging in the self-delusion of epistemic privilege, that debases human consciousness and freedom through an abandonment of responsibility (or, as Niebuhr's philosophical counterparts would say, 'authenticity'). Niebuhr is right to say that, "Anxiety is the internal description of temptation."
20 But temptation is only a natural, ineluctable concomitant of moral freedom. To be morally free is, by defi nition, to be tempted. Temptation is not, in itself, an evil. To the contrary, it is the precondition of all moral achievement-one cannot laud the right choices of angels, for they are no choices at all. 21 Accordingly, Niebuhr speaks of 'faith' not as a means to purge the individual of anxiety but, rather, as a means to "purge anxiety of the tendency toward sinful self-assertion."
22 Thus, he raises the possibility of an unproblematic, even empowering, form of anxiety. Drawing on Kierkegaard's suggestive references to "'anxiety over nothing'-that pregnant anxiety that is directed toward the future and that is a pristine element in every human being," 23 Niebuhr describes this positive form of anxiety as the psychological ground of human creativity. Niebuhr calls such creative anxiety 'anxiety about perfection,' which he contrasts to the more insidious 'anxiety about insecurity.'
24 Anxiety about perfection is occasioned not by fear of uncertainty but, instead, by the desire to push one's understandings and creative accomplishments ever forward, to further the bounds of one's knowledge in the face of the seemingly limitless possibilities presented by human experience and activity. 25 Niebuhr claims, however, that "Anxiety about perfection and about insecurity are . . . inexorably bound together in human actions and the errors which are made in the search for perfection are never due merely to the ignorance of not knowing the limits of conditioned values. They always exhibit some tendency of the agent to hide his own limits, which he knows only too well." 26 And this is surely true. But the fact that no human can achieve a perfectly unadulterated embodiment of the virtuous form of anxiety does not make such anxiety any less virtuous in character, nor should it keep us from encouraging the individual to cultivate the virtue of a more perfected, less adulterated anxiety. It is common to virtues that they exhibit within themselves the potentiality for vice, when they are taken to extremes, or aimed in the wrong direction. Thus, thrift may become greed or acquisitiveness, confi dence may become pride, openmindedness may become licentiousness, etc. Moreover, as already discussed, it is not 'anxiety about insecurity' itself that constitutes the error of unqualifi ed absolutism but, rather, the reaction against such anxiety in the adoption of a dogmatic consciousness. 27 Again, all human beings are necessarily fallible. Thus, fallibility is an epistemic condition of humanity as such, but, like other epistemic conditions, it can be ignored (at least at a conscious level). Anxiety, on the other hand, is both a condition of human existence (a universal one, according to Kierkegaard and his successors) and a response to such existence. As a condition, anxiety represents a central element in what was once called 'philosophical anthropology': the elucidation of the fundamental conditions of human nature and existence, both ontic and epistemic. But its status as such a condition is derivative from its status as a (universal) response to the (defi nitive) condition of fallibility in which each human being fi nds herself, qua human being. 28 And, it seems to me, to the extent that anxiety about fallibility causes one to adopt a more generally circumspect point of view, it is a virtuous response. For it is only in the acceptance of some level of ultimate insecurity-some fundamental preservation of anxiety within the context of committ ed belief-that one can overcome the temptation to deify one's understandings. Only thus can one act on one's own convictions always in such a manner as to respect the right of others to hold and act according to contrary convictions. Hence, an appropriately moderated, but consciously sustained, sense of epistemic anxiety should be viewed as a sign of intellectual and psychological maturity. Indeed, my claim is that such anxiety represents the central epistemic virtue bequeathed (unintentionally) to contemporary democratic society and theory by our Enlightenment predecessors and that this epistemic virtue can help to support and sustain moral, religious, and political virtues, such as humility and tolerance.
An underlying and permanent sense of epistemic anxiety among a democratic citizenry is a socially and politically healthy thing, precisely because it serves to maintain citizens' acknowledgement of their own fallibility (both as individuals and as members of religious and other groups) and, thereby, discourages the sort of illegitimate absolutist and exclusivistic att itudes that tend to undermine the reasonability and productivity of democratic discourses. While an overly anxious att itude regarding one's beliefs can lead to an undesirable moral and political paralysis (or an overly reactionary assertion of supposed "certainty" meant to mask the deeper sense of insecurity), an appropriately moderated and rationalized att itude of anxiety can go far in promoting other democratic virtues, such as intellectual curiosity, cooperativeness and a willingness to compromise, and genuine tolerance of others' beliefs and lifestyles.
Moreover, anxiety, in the sense just outlined, represents a powerful, and in some ways less problematic, alternative to the notion of 'tolerance' as the organizing virtue in discussions of the basis of democratic norms. The notion of tolerance has frequently been criticized as seeming to imply an att itude of mere grudging agreement to coexist. Simply to 'tolerate' another in no way obligates one to att empt more fully to understand the other's perspective or beliefs, nor does it compel one to question the supposed certainty of one's own views. Tolerance, as a mode of engagement with others, can signal just as stalemated and stagnant a conversation as does intolerance. Reasonable anxiety regarding one's own positions, on the other hand, does obligate one to att empt more fully to understand and more fairly to assess alternative positions. And this is so precisely because anxiety, unlike tolerance, is an explicitly epistemic, and not merely a moral-political virtue. Insofar as a reasonable sense of anxiety about one's own epistemic limitations promotes an acknowledgement of the provisionality and revisability of one's opinions, one is encouraged to take democratic discourse seriously, as a cooperative (and relatively non-coercive) mode of inquiry, will-formation, and action. Democratic legal prohibitions against prejudice and forced social or moral conformism gain a normative force that is absent when one is merely constrained by law to "tolerate" those whom one is, nevertheless, "certain" are wrong. 29 In short, a reasonable level of mutually sustained anxiety among citizens regarding their respective beliefs and opinions is the precondition for a democratic society of good-faith.
To be clear, my point here is not that anxiety should wholly displace tolerance from discussions of liberal norms. Rather, I am proposing that epistemic anxiety provides the necessary normative warrant for liberal norms such as tolerance. The logic of my argument is straightforward: Fallibility is an inescapable condition of human experience and understanding. The proper response to this condition is the adoption of a stance of epistemic anxiety (as I am here defi ning that term), because an unqualifi ed confi dence in one's own beliefs-in spite of the recognition of fallibility-would represent a failure adequately to account for the truth of one's fallibility in the formation of one's beliefs (and one's att itude towards them). Furthermore, classical liberalism represents the proper sociopolitical instantiation of epistemic anxiety, because the norm of non-coercion that it propagates is the procedural manifestation of such anxiety in the context of interpersonal action. To deny the liberal principle of non-coercion in the face of human fallibility is to willfully evade the epistemic anxiety that naturally att aches itself to human subjectivity by virtue of its fi nitude and fallen-ness. And to express such an evasion is to idolatrously deify one's own understanding and to violate the sacredness of other human beings' moral and intellectual autonomy through an expression of a selfvalidating "will to power" masquerading as a righteous concern for the salvation of those who are coerced.
The Phenomenology of Epistemic Anxiety
So far, I have characterized the particular notion of anxiety upon which my argument is predicated in terms of a conscious acknowledgement of the intrinsic fallibility of human understanding (especially one's own). In order further to clarify precisely what I mean by 'anxiety,' it will be helpful to contrast my use of this term with certain other, somewhat related, usages of the same word.
First, as should be obvious at this point, the form of anxiety that I have in mind must be distinguished from the common, everyday sense of the word, referring to mental stress or tension associated with some negatively anticipated event, challenge, or trial, as well as the related clinical sense of the word, referring to some form of persistent, neurotic att itude associated with some-real or imaginary-object of dread. Both of these types of anxiety can lead to precisely the sort of hardening of sentiment and opinion-as a reaction against the feelings of uncertainty they represent-that I wish to discourage. Just as Kierkegaard and his existentialist successors are careful to distinguish anxiety from 'fear,' 30 the former must similarly be distinguished from nervousness. To be 'anxious' about one's epistemic limitations as a fi nite being is to be self-consciously aware of one's existential situation and motivated to account for it adequately in one's beliefs, claims, and behavior. To be 'nervous' about these limitations is to neurotically react to them in a way that, paradoxically, denies their inescapability, because such a reaction inevitably leads one either to seek succor in the false comfort of an absolutist mentality (that seems to erase, but in fact merely represses, the unpleasant insecurity from which one takes fl ight) or to embrace despair, indiff erence, and nihilism.
On the other hand, when it is associated with some particular issue of policy or social or ethical concern, the common, non-clinical variety of emotional anxiety can sometimes motivate people to open up to an exchange of ideas aimed at solving some problem or formulating some course of action. George Marcus has discussed the political psychology of such deliberation-inducing anxiety in The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics. 31 According to Marcus, citizens tend to think and act according to habituated patt erns of behavior except when some unanticipated or novel stimulus triggers the emotional response of 'anxiety' about how to think and/or act in light of this new datum or question. Marcus claims that only such visceral, stimulus-specifi c anxiety provokes the engagement of the subject's rational capacities, motivating the 'anxious' subject to employ her deliberative consciousness to come to some resolution of the problem or question at hand and, thereby, alleviate her anxiety. There are some problems with Marcus's account of the role of anxiety and deliberation in the democratic sphere, however. First, he makes ordinary citizens overly dependent upon political elites, such as members of government and the media, who are given almost sole responsibility for recognizing emerging problems and issues and employing emotive rhetoric in order to inspire the requisite anxiety among the people at-large. 34 This is a problem precisely because, in a democratic society, it is ultimately the underlying att itudes and inclinations of the demos itself that are refl ected in the choices that politicians and the media make about what sorts of discussions to have and how to portray those discussions to the public. If the public doesn't maintain a constant sense of engagement with emerging issues, then they will not demand, nor will politicians and media outlets provide, the sort of discourse that promotes genuinely democratic and deliberative decision-making.
Also, Marcus seems not only to invest too great a trust in political elites not to abuse the power of anxiety provoking rhetoric, but also too readily to assume that the mobilization of public anxiety will, more oft en than not, lead to reasoned discourse, as opposed to reactionism and narrowed sentiment and imagination. This problem is directly related to the previous one: a populace that is accustomed to maintaining a reasonable level of deliberation-inducing anxiety at all times will be less likely to fall prey to waves of irrational anxiety associated with specifi c socially or politically traumatic or revolutionary events or circumstances. 35 Finally, Marcus's account of anxiety remains superfi cial precisely because he views anxiety only as an emotive state, without signifi cant or coherent cognitive content-part of the "unaware and inarticulate" realm of emotional response, which he sharply divides from conscious thought. 36 Hence, he is unable to appreciate the cognitive signifi cance of anxiety as an intellectual, and not merely an emotional, state or response. Nor is he able to formulate the possibility of a systematic (or methodological) anxiety that permanently maintains the engagement of deliberative openness by permanently maintaining a sense of anxiety associated with the absence of both ultimate certitude and static socio-political equilibrium.
Nevertheless, as a description of the psychological connection between the emotional component of anxiety and its intellectual, moral, religious, and political implications, Marcus's account can provide a fi rst step toward a deeper phenomenology of the more thoroughgoing epistemic anxiety I am advocating. 37 In a sense, one might view such epistemic anxiety as a systematic intellectual and practical generalization of the mindset of deliberative openness that Marcus describes as the ideal outcome of issuespecifi c anxiety. The transient emotive state of anxiety that he describes can represent the psychological precursor to the adoption of the deeper, permanent epistemic anxiety of the self-refl ective democrat, but only insofar as this transient state of uncertainty and deliberative engagement is consciously detached from, and generalized beyond, the provoking stimulus in relation to which it arises. The feeling of anxiety must be intellectually internalized and transformed into an explicit awareness of one's own, and others', intrinsic fallibility.
Obviously, one who adopts a stance of epistemic anxiety will, at times, experience the psychological correlate of emotional anxiety. Yet, such emotionally weighted anxiety must not take on an urgency that contravenes the impulse to remain open to dialogue. Nor should it sink into a morbidity that relinquishes deliberation for despair. Indeed, it is important to note the diff erence between 'anxiety' and 'despair,' where the latt er indicates not merely a recognition of human fallibility but also an abandonment of the ideals of objective rationality and truth that are presupposed by deliberation as such. This is the point at which the present defense of epistemic anxiety departs most sharply from the existentialist tradition it references. The anxiety that I am advocating here does not presuppose the dissolution of the idea of objective reasons (or even values). It recognizes our character as self-defi ning beings who make choices about what to believe, choices that are limited by our own fi nitude and that are, therefore, fallible. And it acknowledges that it can be "anguishing to know that our freedom is so far-reaching as to leave our existence permanently unsett led in this way." 38 But it need not go so far as to pronounce, as the existentialists typically do, that there is no source of values that transcends fi nite human understandings and to which such understandings can legitimately make reference.
It is no less 'authentic' to believe, wholeheartedly, that one has apprehended some objective truth about the human condition or right conduct but, in recognition of one's own fallibility, to avoid any imposition of one's view onto others, than it is to toss aside the notion of moral objectivity entirely and simply "own" one's choices as though they made reference to nothing outside of the arbitrary (or perhaps anthropologically imposed) conditions of one's own will. One need not accept Sartre's claim that "nothing, absolutely nothing, justifi es me in adopting this or that particular value," 39 in order to be true to the insight that one's choices among possible values or actions may be fl awed or incomplete, or may (at least in some cases) have equally valid alternatives. Mauvaise foi is expressed in claims such as that one could not possibly be mistaken in one's belief about 'x,' or that one's belief about 'x' is exempted somehow from the normal rules of reason and evidence, or that some beliefs are epistemically privileged, or that some interpretation of a text is self-evidently 'inerrant.' There is no bad faith or self-deception in the claim that one holds fi rmly to certain beliefs or accepts certain interpretations for reasons that seem to transcend the caprice of mere self-defi nition, uninformed by objective reference, if one simultaneously acknowledges the possibility that one is mistaken about these reasons. So long as one abstains from leveling unqualifi ed judgments at those with whom one disagrees, or trying to force them to submit to one's view irrespective of their own wishes and beliefs, and remains open to being persuaded otherwise, there is no illegitimate fl ight from anxiety.
Kierkegaard sees the embodiment of authentically lived anxiety in the person of Socrates, 40 who remains in a permanent state of epistemic anxiety precisely because he-unlike Kierkegaard's 'knight of faith'-refuses to make the subjective leap into 'the absurd.' Instead, Socrates relentlessly confronts the limits of his own understanding, while simultaneously bursting the epistemic bubbles of his various interlocutors. Socrates' wisdom lies in his consistent awareness of his own "ignorance," and his generalization of this awareness as an epistemic principle that leads him to be suspicious of all unqualifi ed knowledge claims and to compulsively pursue deliberative debate with others. Such wisdom, or "Socratic ignorance," 41 as Kierkegaard calls it, does not preclude personal commitment. Indeed, Socrates is willing to die for his beliefs. But what Socrates would presumably not be willing to do is to take the life (or infringe illegitimately on the freedom) of another in order to promote his own beliefs. Socratic anxiety, as I would now like to call it, requires circumspection and humility, but not indecision or paralysis.
Hume-who consistently recognized the imperatives of belief and action, in the face of his own skeptical doubts about human understandingbeautifully characterizes the att itude and practical implications associated with Socratic anxiety in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 42 At one point, his skeptical character Philo responds to the charge that skepticism, like stoicism, represents a philosophy that can be entertained at an intellectual level but that is impossible to live out in a truly consistent manner. Philo replies:
I allow of your comparison between the Stoics and the Skeptics. . . . But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest fl ights of philosophy, yet, even when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and the eff ects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. . . . In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to skeptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his refl ection on other subjects; but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say, in his common conduct, he will be found diff erent from those who either never formed any opinions in the case or have entertained sentiments more favorable to human reason. 43 I have no intention to equate Socratic anxiety with outright 'skepticism,' and I, for one, certainly do entertain "sentiments more favorable to human reason" than those, at times, expostulated by Hume. Yet, as a committ ed democrat, I fi nd his description of a mode of reasoning and living that is chastened by a recognition of one's own (and everyone else's) ultimate fallibility very appealing.
I, personally, do believe that human understanding can claim some genuinely objective knowledge of the world as it is independently of our own mental-linguistic constructions-even if this knowledge can only be expressed through the employment of such constructions. I also believe that there are certain logically necessary, a priori truths, such as that expressed by the 'law of non-contradiction.' But there is no obviously correct, no 'self-evident,' set of moral regulations or judgments that can simply be deduced from such knowledge with unambiguous certitude. (Nor is there any legitimate shortcut around fallibility through the arbitrary epistemic privileging of certain 'scriptures' or other supposed repositories of infallible wisdom.) While I have strong opinions about many issues, and may even feel at times that I cannot understand how any reasonable person could disagree with certain propositions, I always know that equally reasonable people do in fact disagree over even the most fundamental moral, religious, and political issues (which, of course, is not to say that all positions in any such dispute are equally reasonable 44 ). Given the acknowledgement that it is, in principle, always possible that I am the one who is mistaken, even regarding my most deeply held beliefs, I cannot legitimately claim the right to coerce others to believe as I do. Nor can I-in the absence of some voluntary agreement to the contrary-claim the right to force them to act in accordance with my principles rather than their own. Of course, this position need not imply pacifi sm, and it certainly does not imply anarchism. Indeed, one of my central points is precisely that the recognition of human fallibility that is represented by this doctrine of anxiety has normative implications at a meta-political level, implications such as that the use of force or coercive power may be employed to prevent others from violating the freedom of their fellow human beings out of some misguided sense of epistemic or moral superiority. Anxiety about fallibility would have been a good reason for the nineteeth-and twentieth-century struggles against slavery and fascism, for example, not a reason to have tolerated such practices.
Hume (through Philo) continues, in the same passage quoted above, to remark: "To whatever length anyone may push his speculative principles of skepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing." 45 Since the bearer of Socratic anxiety is not necessarily quite so pessimistic about human reason as the Humean skeptic, "the absolute necessity" to act, live, and, especially, converse may be understood by the Socratic liberal not as an arbitrary and imposed requirement of human existence but, rather, as a valuable epistemic compensation. Yes, we are thrust into a world that showers us with data while limiting the perspective from which we apprehend it. But we are not thrust into this world alone. We have the company of others, who likewise perceive the world from limited perspectives, but perspectives not our own. And our diff ering perspectives off er opportunities for correlation and contrast, for verifi cation and falsifi cation-or at least concurrence or challenge. 46 Thus, we stand also under the obligation (not "absolute" but normative) to condition our belief with humility-for humility is one fundamental moral and religious virtue that follows directly from the epistemic virtue of anxiety.
We can and should advocate our respective views. We must argue. And we've every right to att empt through all legitimate means to persuade. But we cannot arrogate to ourselves the right to coerce (at least not outside of the legitimate coercive requirements of democratic decision-making procedures). For in doing so we deify our own, decidedly non-divine and fi nite, understandings. The phenomenology of epistemic, or Socratic, anxiety encompasses various levels, from the emotive to the intellectual, and it has both methodological and practical implications. In practical terms, though, it boils down to a genuine respect for disagreement; a principled preference for substantive dialogue as a means of decision-making; an affi rmation of compromise over unilateralism in moral, social, and political aff airs; and a strong reluctance to call upon force to reshape circumstance before all other viable options have been exhausted.
Anxiety and Tolerance
The idea that genuinely recognizing human fallibility requires allowing the free exchange of ideas, respect for others' opinions, and remaining open to the possibility that one is mistaken is hardly revolutionary. It was revolutionary when Milton put it forward in his Areopagitica, 47 and again when Locke reiterated the theme in his Lett er Concerning Toleration. 48 And it was less revolutionary but importantly expanded and clarifi ed when Mill championed it in On Liberty. 49 But Milton could not-because of his own religious commitments-take his argument to its logical conclusion, and he ends up with a signifi cant residue of epistemic privilege in his stance towards the truth claims of (Protestant) Christianity, a residue that survives in Locke. Mill's theorization of fallibility (largely) achieves the consistency that Milton and Locke failed to realize. But Mill himself sets the stage for the methodological transition away from theorized fallibility by following Locke in turning immediately to the notion of 'tolerance' as the moral-political virtue non plus ultra of political liberalism. 50 The problem with tolerance, from a non-liberal perspective, is that theoretically it is presented as a sort of meta-virtue that ought to transcend all various substantive points-of-view, but practically it presents itself as an externally imposed mandate that is inconsistent with the prescriptions of some substantive points-of-view. In other words, the claim that tolerance represents a perspective-neutral principle of rational discourse is challenged on the grounds that tolerance confl icts with certain religious and moral conceptions that stress the need for universal adherence to some set of epistemically privileged doctrines. Hence, the issue is oft en treated as a confl ict between the civic virtue of tolerance and the religious virtue of 'faith.' But, as the preceding discussion of epistemic anxiety suggests, this strictly polemical view of the relation between liberal tolerance and religious faith rests on fundamental misconceptions of each of these notions.
In his classic work on the relationship between faith and knowledge in religious belief, the contemporary philosopher of religion John Hick observes that, "According to the most widespread view of the matt er today faith is unevidenced or inadequately evidenced belief." He then goes on to add:
Faith thus consists in believing strongly various propositions, of a theological nature, which the believer does not and cannot know to be true. To know here is taken to mean either to observe directly or to be able to prove by strict determination. Where this is possible, there is no room for faith. It is only that which lies beyond the scope of human knowledge that must be taken, if at all, on faith or trust. When in such a case we do adopt some belief, the lack of rational compulsion to assent is compensated by an act of will, a voluntary leap of trust. 51 The problem with this view lies in the qualifi cation expressed in the fi rst line of the quote: "of a theological nature." This implies that 'faith' is not an element in decisions about what to believe in other arenas. In other words, this formulation assumes that in all of the non-theological realms of human inquiry and belief it is possible always (or at least very oft en) to "observe directly or . . . to prove by strict determination." Furthermore, this view assumes that it is generally the case in non-theological matt ers that interpretations of that which is "observe[d] directly" and outcomes of "strict" proofs are uncontroversial, because there is a "rational compulsion to assent." But is this the case?
To be sure, it sometimes seems to me that the evidence or arguments regarding some issue so strongly support one view of the matt er that I feel rationally compelled to assent to that view. Yet, almost invariably there is someone else-someone whom I would not be willing to simply dismiss as "irrational"-who disagrees. Moreover, even in the most 'objective' (and I do not mean to belitt le this term) fi elds of inquiry, it is oft en simply not possible to directly observe or strictly demonstrate the answer to questions of real signifi cance. This does not mean that thought shuts down in the face of such uncertainty. Inquiry, like life, must proceed in the absence of fi nal certainty. Thus, science, very much like religion, proceeds in agreement where agreement is possible, and it is the backdrop of general agreement that allows for the pursuit of those points about which no such agreement exists, sometimes leading to discoveries or new theories that destabilize or demolish the prior consensus from which they proceeded. This is the pragmatic-evolutionary character of scientifi c inquiry, and of life in general.
Thus, 'faith' is present in all aspects of human understanding. 52 To be clear, I do not deny that there is a signifi cant diff erence in the degree of faith required to affi rm, say, the basic principles of the theory of natural selection, as opposed to the claim that the Nicene Trinitarian formula expresses some fundamental truth about ultimate reality. The latt er certainly rests on a thinner evidential foundation. I am simply denying that there is a categorical diff erence between the two. That is not to say that there are not generally reasons to believe in one way rather than another. But such reasons rarely, if ever, "compel assent" 53 for everyone who encounters them-and those who believe that they do may be mistaken. The failure to recognize that thought and action always depend on some degree of faith that one has seen things rightly not only encourages non-religious people to unjustifi ably disdain the notion of religious faith per se, but also encourages many religious people themselves to accept the notion that the objects of belief relevant to their religious lives lie "beyond the scope of human knowledge" and are, therefore, exempt from the normal rules of evidence. Strict fi deism makes no sense if questions such as "Is this text demonstrably the 'Word of God'?" are in fact open to some measure of rational adjudication.
The putative uniqueness of religious belief, as being a matt er of faith, provides support for the traditionalist (monotheistic) religious notion that faith is a mysterious, divinely-bestowed third element standing between the believing subject and the object of belief, encouraging some 'believers' to view the 'unbelief' (notice, not 'alternative belief') of others as a product (and sign) of the latt er's moral degeneracy or spiritual defi ciency, rather than simply a matt er of intellectual disagreement over an issue on which it is possible for reasonable people to disagree. This misconception further obscures the too litt le discussed resources for combating absolutism that exist within religious traditions, like Christianity, in which the urge to absolutism has been historically pronounced. 54 Such intolerant believers embrace what we may call Calvin's contradiction, aft er the theologian who, perhaps, most brazenly weds the notions of religious certainty and textual and interpretive 'inerrancy' with the directly contradictory notion of humanity's moral and epistemic 'fallenness.' 55 Calvin's steadfast refusal to consider the implications of his view of human 'depravity' for his own claims regarding the nature and meaning of 'scripture' has conditioned Protestant belief ever since, sett ing the stage for the fl ight from anxiety that has helped to push the self-satisfi ed certainty of many Christians in tragically (and sinfully) aggressive and intolerant directions.
Indeed, this all too common propensity to circumscribe the epistemic implications of fi nitude within the bounds of an absolutist and exclusivistic religious understanding represents one important reason why the traditional virtue of 'humility' cannot play the role I am ascribing here to anxiety. Humility, like tolerance, is a religious, moral, and political virtue, not an epistemic one. Humility certainly can be connected to the epistemic conditions of fi nitude, and, yet, one need not genuinely recognize these conditions in order to affi rm humility as a virtue. Many religious absolutists acknowledge the rightness of a humble att itude, but they envision such humility as part and parcel of their fi deism. From this perspective, one has humility towards God, not towards one's own beliefs about God. Perhaps one also is encouraged to remain humble in one's relations to other humans, but, again, this is encouraged as a requirement of, but not with respect to, one's religious and moral convictions. It was not humility but, rather, anxiety that helped provoke the modern west's move towards liberalism. The relationship of anxiety to humility is not one of equivalence, it is one in which the former grounds the latt er more deeply. 56 The notion of epistemic anxiety stands as a corrective to the tendency among many religious believers to conveniently ignore the implications of human fi nitude for religious belief. Fundamentalism is idolatry. This is a language that will strike closer to home for many who are not persuaded by the notion of tolerance. The same people who most vociferously hurl the charge of "playing God" at those who extend their technological reach beyond what the former think appropriate are those most oft en guilty of playing God epistemically, of deifying their own fi nite, fallible understandings. And this argument leaves litt le room for strong rebutt al. Even the most conservative traditionalist will not be so brazen as to claim infallibility. Of course, they will claim it on behalf of some person or group of persons portrayed in their religious tradition (e.g., Jesus and the biblical authors), but even sett ing aside the a priori argument from fi nitude and granting, hypothetically, the possibility that some person(s) might have possessed infallibility, the problem remains that only another infallible person could inerrantly recognize the infallibility of the fi rst. And no religious tradition of which I am aware licenses such a claim by the practitioner.
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At this point, some readers may object that there is an apparent paradox or self-contradiction implicit in my account of epistemic anxiety and/or in the general liberal principle of non-coercion that I seek to justify through this account. Such an objection might take several diff erent forms: First, there is a formal conception of the (putative) paradox that is as old as the liberalism it is meant to counter. This version of the objection claims that the principle of non-coercion is, if enforced, self-violating, because it requires (or may require) the employment of coercive means in order to prevent actions 58 that are judged to be contradictory to or inconsistent with the principle-e.g., the use of federal law enforcement powers to ensure compliance with civil rights statutes and judicial determinations at state and local levels. Traditionally, liberal theorists have responded to this criticism by drawing a distinction between 'substantive' and 'procedural' norms and by arguing that liberal political regulation is purely procedural-and, therefore, substantively 'neutral'-in character. 59 Thus, the liberal prohibition against coercion is viewed as categorically diff erent in character from any substantive belief or principle of action that might be enforced contrary to such a prohibition. And this diff erence stems, in part, from the fact that liberalism leaves untouched the individual's right and capacity to believe and personally to act upon whatever beliefs she may acquire (through whatever relevant process of belief formation one might identify), so long as she does not violate others' right to this same freedom. Hence, the validity of the enforcement of liberal norms is connected to the ineluctable, pragmatic exigencies of social life.
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Human beings must socialize across ideological lines, 61 and the only way to do so without enduring endless cycles of violent confl ict or arbitrary oppression of some individuals or groups by others is to adopt procedural regulations regarding such socialization that mutually maximize the respective rights to substantive freedom of all members of society. But such mutual maximization of rights requires the minimization of the capacity of any particular substantive viewpoint to intrude upon any other. While it is true that the latt er form of regulation limits the former (at least for those perspectives that validate intrusiveness), it does so of necessity, and, thus, the complaint against it is what Berlin would call a mere "counsel of perfection." Every perspective is limited in the same way, and none more so than any other-and this includes the liberal perspective, which is uniquely self-limiting (see below). Furthermore, as Charles Larmore rightly observes: "If just laws serve to check the arbitrary will of others, their impact on our conduct and the prohibitions they impose do not amount in themselves to a reduction in our freedom. By doing away with our vulnerability, they bring into existence a realm of freedom that we would not otherwise have." 62 Alternatively, one might object that my affi rmation of the principle of human fallibility, upon which my conception of epistemic anxiety-and, therefore, my formulation of the basis of the principle of non-coercion and other liberal norms-is based, is self-refuting, because such an assertion of fallibility itself is subject to doubt on its own grounds. In other words, my claim that all human understanding is fallible is also, on its own logic, fallible and, therefore, dubitable. But does this really represent a paradox or self-contradiction? I do not think so, because 'fallible' is not the same as 'false.' I can perfectly well admit that my own conception of human fallibility is, itself, fallible, while maintaining my conviction that it is, also, true. Indeed, this is the only self-consistent manner in which I can maintain this conviction. I am simply admitt ing that it is possible that I'm wrong about all of this. That doesn't mean that I am wrong. Possibility is not actuality.
This particular possibility does have normative implications, however, which is precisely why, as I noted earlier, I (and other liberals of my type) stop short of seeking to coercively disabuse others of their own absolutist perspectives. As I just discussed above, the claims of liberalism are inextricably linked to the conditions (and necessities) of social life. The enforcement of liberal norms supported by my conception of human fallibility and epistemic anxiety is-consistently with its own logic-self-limiting as well as regulatory. That is, the regulatory reach of this conception of the normativity of liberal norms is limited by its own internal check on the claims of authority, including its own authority. Obviously, this is not to say that I will not att empt by all appropriate means of persuasion to convince others that absolutist understandings are inherently fl awed and pernicious, just as I expect that they will att empt to convince me otherwise. I value such dialogue precisely because of my recognition of my own fallibility (indeed, that is the point). Moreover, my obligatory affi rmation of the fallibility of my own view is the reason why I have deployed various arguments to support my claim regarding the ineluctability of human fallibility vis-à-vis religious beliefs. If I could somehow infallibly prove human fallibility (now, there would be a paradox), then such arguments would be superfl uous (and, in the case of the example just given, mistaken).
Finally, one might formulate the objection substantively, rather than formally, by challenging the logic of epistemic anxiety in relation to the very dynamics of belief. This form of the objection might proceed thus: Imagine that I hold a set of beliefs that, among other things, implies that I have an obligation to enforce a particular doctrinal orthodoxy by preventing the dissemination of heretical views and, if necessary, to do so coercively. Further, assume that this set of beliefs is at least prima facie rational, because it is based upon my considered assessment of the relevant evidence. The foregoing account of the normative implications of epistemic anxiety appears, in this case, to require that, given any doubt whatsoever regarding the certainty of my beliefs in general, I must reject as false a specifi c belief that currently I hold as true upon the basis of the preponderance of evidence as I construe it. This seems to be a paradoxical conclusion (and, perhaps, an impossible requirement in practice, given the oft en involuntary character of belief formation as a function of evidential consideration).
But this objection misconstrues the relationship of epistemic anxiety to the dynamic of belief that informs our hypothetical orthodoxist's conviction. My point is that human fallibility itself is an ineluctable element in the body of evidence that our erstwhile believer must consider in forming her beliefs in the fi rst place. In other words, epistemic anxiety does not require that she paradoxically fi nd false a belief that she heretofore held to be true on reasonable grounds; rather, it calls into question the assumed reasonableness of her belief that she is justifi ed in approaching others coercively because such a belief necessarily ignores the epistemic implications of the fact of human fallibility (and it is worth emphasizing that my claim is limited to her belief in her right of coercion; she may, on my view, continue reasonably to have faith in her overall belief system, despite her recognition of its fallibility, since there can be no rational obligation to eschew substantive belief in general-because "ought implies can"). Thus, the normative connection between fallibility and anxiety, and, in turn, between anxiety and liberalism, is founded on the very rational obligation to consider all relevant and available evidence in the formation of one's beliefs to which this objection refers. Now, one might att empt to avoid this implication for religious belief by admitt ing that fallibility is, indeed, an ineluctable condition of human nature and, therefore, a signifi cant evidential factor that must be considered in the formation of rational belief but, also, claiming that revelation-when added into the mix of evidential support for a certain set of beliefs-can override the normative implication of fallibility by providing a touchstone of certainty that trumps all reasonable doubt. But, as I have already shown, this position involves a vicious regress, because any claim to an infallible, revelatory understanding could only be inerrantly identifi ed as such by one who was, already, also infallible (and therefore without need of such a revelation, in any case).
The same logic obviously holds, mutatis mutandis, for any revelatory text, act, etc. Indeed, with things like texts and acts, the problem is compounded by issues of interpretation. 63 Hence, appeals to revelatory knowledge can validate the claims of faith only when that faith is conditioned by an acceptance of the fallibility of the very "knowledge" provided by (and deciphered from) the revelation(s) in question-that is, only when that faith embraces the virtue of epistemic anxiety.
Nor will it do to admit that human fallibility must be considered as one element in the evidential mix but claim that a consideration of the whole of the evidence might still, legitimately, lead one to affi rm an orthodoxist position (if that implies a willingness to coerce others to think as one does or to force them to act in accordance with an ideology they do not share). The implications of acknowledging one's own fallibility must be viewed categorically, not as a matt er of degree, in relation to one's interactions with others. For there is a categorical diff erence, morally speaking, between voluntarily adopting and adhering to a perspective or ideology on the basis of one's own fallible construal of the evidence for and against it and forcing someone else to adopt and/or adhere to it contrarily to her own judgment on the matt er. It is one thing, to take a currently prominent example, for an individual to suppress and refrain from acting upon her own homosexual tendencies on the basis of her commitment to a religious perspective that proscribes them. It is quite another thing for her and other members of her religious community to seek coercively to impose the same proscription on others. This is the point at which epistemic anxiety connects with respect for the dignity of the individual. As I indicated in my discussion of Kant, liberalism certainly depends upon such respect, but it also depends-crucially, I think-on the recognition that respecting human dignity requires respecting the right of others to construct, and live in accordance with, diverse conceptions of what contributes to and what derogates from that dignity. And, I submit, it is epistemic anxiety, as I have formulated it here, that produces and supports this further recognition. If one could know infallibly that one's own perspective on any matt er of moral judgment were correct, then such knowledge would (at least arguably) override the moral distinction between adopting the requirements of this perspective for oneself and imposing them on others. Without such a guarantee, however, one must respect the right of others to adopt contrary perspectives as a matt er of highest principle. Therefore, tolerance is not an "externally imposed mandate" that stifl es the spirit of religious belief by holding in check its naturally evangelical impulse. Rather, it is an internal requirement of the logic of the religious mentality, which is founded upon the recognition of humanity's inadequacy in the face of forces and questions that are larger than us, holding in check what Niebuhr calls "the tendency toward sinful self-assertion." Thus, true religious faith does not imply a 'teleological suspension of the ethical,' 64 nor, for that matt er, the liberal. For such faith-insofar as it makes even implicit reference to the distinction between the infi nitude of its object and the fi nitude of its subject-necessarily includes recognition of the inadequacy of the individual's understandings and, therefore, prohibits dogmatically motivated action that transgresses contractual ethical norms and freedoms. In other words, genuinely self-refl ective faith in something that is believed to transcend the human, eo ipso, implies the normativity of liberal norms, like tolerance.
Tolerance is not the foundational virtue of liberalism. Tolerance is derivative from anxiety, psychologically, historically, and theoretically. 65 Anxiety about the limitations of one's own understanding-an inescapable byproduct of the erosion of appeals to epistemic privilege that helps defi ne the Enlightenment mentality-is the true sine qua non of liberal democratic culture. In a society in which epistemic anxiety is suppressed, neither tolerance nor liberty can long survive.
Conclusion
Finally, I would like to say a last word regarding the common connotations of the term 'anxiety.' While I have tried to show that there are good reasons for accepting a use of the term that is positive, rather than negative, it should also be clear that the mindset that I am propounding is a diffi cult one. The conscious acceptance of anxiety, in the sense I have outlined here, represents the embrace of a higher level of self-responsibility. This is not an easy task, nor should we expect it to be. If virtuous att itudes and behaviors came easily, we would all live in near utopias. This is one thing that religious consciousness understands and that liberals have been too reluctant to insist upon. Genuine liberal democracy, like genuine spirituality, makes serious, sometimes even unpleasant, demands on its practitioners. We must give something up, in order to gain something immeasurably greater-in this case, the ignorant bliss of a self-satisfi ed understanding, for a society in which people are free to choose for themselves not only how to interpret the world but also how to live in it.
Sartre, at one point, observes that the existentialists' diagnosis of the human condition is rejected "not [because of] our pessimism, but the sternness of our optimism." 66 We live in a world in which only a stern optimism is a credible optimism. Anxiety regarding our inescapable fallibility-in-fi nitude represents more than a past turning point in human history; it represents the maturation of human consciousness, and maturity, like civilization, has its discomforts. But without an ever-present sense of such anxiety, we fall back into a self-satisfaction (or worse, a nervous bellicosity) that belies the fundamental truth revealed in all of the world's great traditions of wisdom: we are imperfect.
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10. There were, of course, dissenters from the Enlightenment cult of reason, Hume chief among them, but I am speaking here of the general character of Enlightenment thought, and it is notable that, for example, Hume 13. As Charles Larmore observes, there is a "third" concept of liberty at work in classical Western political theory, one that has reemerged in a prominent way in recent republican political theory, namely, liberty as 'nondomination.' This conception of liberty fi ts into Berlin's schema as a 'negative,' rather than 'positive,' conception, but it diff ers from Berlin's own (Hobbesian) formulation of negative liberty in two important ways: First, republican theorists, unlike Berlin, count not only actual but also possible interference by others as an infringement upon liberty. That is, one is less free not only if another acts so as to limit one's choices but also to the extent that another has the power so to act, even if that power is voluntarily unexercised (whereas Berlin claimed, for example, that negative liberty was consistent with the existence of a benevolent despot). Second, this republican conception of negative liberty does not understand all government regulation as necessarily contravening liberty in some way-that is, as a "necessary evil"-because such regulation can, in fact, produce and support types and degrees of liberty impossible in its absence (I will return to this point near the end of this essay). See Larmore's unpublished essay "The Meanings of Political Freedom." On my reading, this conception of liberty as non-domination is highly consonant with the conception of liberal norms that I am linking to epistemic anxiety in this essay. Indeed, as Larmore observes, proponents of this conception "defi ned liberty as not living at the mercy of another's will and did so not least with an eye to that form of domination which springs from according some single but contested vision of the human good a favored status in the political community" ("Meanings," p. 12-see, also, pp. 13-15).
